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Quality of education is a determining factor in competitiveness. In order to globally compete, Mexico would 
have to raise its standards beyond its current low achievement. Several innovations at federal and state levels 
have been developed to raise the quality of basic education. One example is Carrera Magisterial (CM), which 
is a professional development program that was created as part of the National Agreement for the 
Modernization of Basic Education in 1992. This program is aimed at raising the quality of basic education 
through teachers’ professional training, new learning presence in schools and improving working and salary 
conditions. This paper evaluates the impact of CM. It shows several important results. First, teacher's 
enrollment in the CM program has a positive impact on learning achievement. Second, family characteristics 
are important in explaining students’ achievement. Third, investment in primary school teachers is most 
effective when targeted toward increasing teachers’ practical experience and developing content-specific 
knowledge. Fourth, students in schools with a high degree of supervision on the part of the school principal 
achieve better scores.  
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MAIN ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS 
 
 
ANMEB  National Agreement for the Modernization of Basic Education 
(Acuerdo Nacional para la Modernización de la Educación Básica) 
 
EEEP    The Primary Education Assessment Survey, second round 1997 
(Encuesta de Evaluación de Educación Primaria, segundo levantamiento 1997) 
 
INEGI    National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Information 
(Instituto National de Estadística, Geografía e Informática) 
 
SEP    Ministry of Education 
(Secretaría de Educación Pública) 
 
SNTE    National Union of Education Workers 
    (Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación) 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Good quality of education is critical in the new era of global competition and technological change. Mexico’s 
future development depends on its ability to take advantage of new opportunities quickly and decisively. 
Good basic education that can be accessible to all is a necessary element for a sustainable, poverty-reducing 
development strategy. 
This paper is part of a series that examines teachers’ incentives and professional development in Mexico, 
in pursuit of the long-term goal of improving student learning performance.
1 The paper is divided into the 
following sections: the background succinctly places the objectives in context. Section 3 describes the data 
and methodology used in this paper. Section 4 compares school factors and management that are correlated 
with learning achievement in highly effective and ineffective schools. Section 5 measures the impact of 
school factors on learning achievement, particularly Carrera Magisterial, teachers' salaries and training. 




Mexico is a federal country with a population of almost 97.4 million people spread unevenly over nearly 2 
million square kilometers. About three-fourths live in urban areas. The country is relatively young—24 
percent of the population is between 5-14 years old. The share of this age group in the total population is the 
highest among OECD countries, which have an average of about 14 percent. The pace of demographic growth 
has been dropping dramatically in recent times. As a result, the population under 6 years old has been 
decreasing at the rate of 0.5 percent a year, while the 6-14 age group has been increasing by no more than 0.1 
percent a year. By the end of the century, the total number of persons in this age group will have virtually 
stabilized. 
  The structure of Mexico’s educational system has the following main characteristics. Basic education 
is the Mexican government’s highest priority. The basic education system consists of: (a) early childhood 
education (or pre-school), which is optional for children 3 to 5 years old; (b) mandatory primary education, 
                                                           
1 Lopez-Acevedo and Salinas (2000a) Teacher’s Salaries and Professional Profile in Mexico. The World Bank Mimeo. 
Lopez-Acevedo and Salinas (2000b) Factors that Affect Learning Achievement in Mexico: The Case of Mexico D.F., 
Nuevo Leon and Tabasco. The World Bank. Mimeo. 
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ideally from ages 6 to 12, but due to late enrollment and grade repetition targeted to ages 6 to 14, and (c) 
mandatory lower secondary school, consisting of a 3-year cycle, and intended for children ages 12 to 16.  
The Mexican educational system has become highly centralized in the hands of the federal government. 
This centralization is reflected by the growing share of federal schools in total enrollment, which rose from 64 
percent in 1970 to 72 percent in 1990. In May 1992, however, the states, the federal government structures, 
and the National Union of Workers in Education (Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación, 
SNTE) signed the National Agreement for the Modernization of Basic Education (Acuerdo Nacional para la 
Modernización de la Educación Básica, ANMEB). This agreement was created in response to demand for a 
decentralized educational system. This agreement should allow states to have more participation. Previous 
attempts to decentralize the educational system have failed due to constraints on the states and federal 
government structures and to the opposition of the SNTE. ANMEB is part of a long process that yielded 
satisfactory results until May 1992, when the federal government, state governors, federal agencies and the 
SNTE signed the agreement. 
This program had three main objectives. The first was associated with the reorganization of the 
educational system, which consisted in the transfer of the education sector, formerly administered by the 
federal government, to the States. The transfer included 513,974 teachers, 116,054 administrative posts, 
3,954,000 hourly salaries, 1.8 million pre-school students, 9.2 million primary students, 2.4 million secondary 
students, and 22 million diverse materials. 
The second objective was the reformulation of regional educational content, in which states received the 
authority and the right to propose changes. Proposals are evaluated by SEP and, if accepted, included in the 
Free Textbook System (Sistema Nacional de Libro de Texto Gratuito). In this respect, the role of the states is 
to propose content, while the federal government decides and puts the proposal into practice. 
The last objective, the revaluation of teaching activities, consisted in launching Carrera Magisteria, for 
basic education teachers and union members. Overall, the objective was to improve teachers' welfare through 
better salaries and housing policies. 
2´
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2  The Appendix presents a detailed review of the educational decentralization process in Mexico. 
3 The ANMEB aimed at reorganizing the educational system through a process of administrative decentralization, as well 
as a revision of the basic educational program and the production of adequate textbooks. In accordance with this 
agreement, the federal government transferred the control and management of the basic education schools to the state 
governments. The 1992 agreement carried with it only a very limited idea of decentralization. Still, the federal 
government remains responsible for general policies and standards (normative and policy-making functions), teachers’   5
In this context, the federal government modified its educational discourse, placing more emphasis on the 
quality of educative content instead of the previous focus on educational coverage. As mentioned above, 
Carrera Magisterial was created as part of the ANMEB in 1992. It was aimed at raising the quality of basic 
education through teachers’ professional training, new learning presence in schools, and improving working 
conditions. One component of this program is the training of teachers; another is a merit payment system in 
which professional staff is voluntarily evaluated and rewarded with salary increases for their performance as 
classroom teachers, school directors-supervisors and administrators (tecnico-pedagogicas). The evaluation is 
based on experience (10 points), professional skills (28 points), educational school level (15 points) and 
completion of accredited courses (17 points). In the case of teachers' performance in school, 30 points are 
given to student’s learning achievement and professional performance.  
As with principals and supervisors, 30 points are given to school performance and professional 
achievement. Teachers in the third area (tercera vertiente) obtain 30 points for educational support. All the 
teachers in any one of the following modalities are considered as candidates for the program: initial education, 
basic education, indigenous schools and lower secondary education via television (telesecundaria). There are 
five levels of promotion (“A”, “B”, “C”, “D”, “E”).  The salary rewards allocated to each represent a salary 
increase but do not represent a change in the type of post assigned to the teacher. The amount assigned to each 
of these levels is a considerable increase with respect to the number of hours worked in the initial post. 
According to the General Direction of Evaluation (SEP), 21 percent of a teacher's total salary at Level "A" 
comes from Carrera Magisterial program.  Carrera Magisterial contributes  38, 51, 61 and 68 percent  to a 
teacher at Level "B", "C", "D" or "E," respectively. The promotion ladder attaches considerable importance to 
seniority within this program, posts or teaching jobs in under developed areas. Once a teacher gets the 
Carrera Magisterial benefit, it is extremely rare that he/she looses it. If a teacher retires, she/he cannot be 
promoted within Carrera Magisterial unless assigned to administrative tasks (tecnico-pedagogicas). 
The Mexican government is the predominant provider of basic educational services. It owns about 91 
percent of primary and secondary schools, which account for 90 percent of the enrollment.
4 At university 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
formation and allocation, textbook production, evaluation and monitoring, and the provision of financial resources 
needed to ensure proper coverage and quality of the educational system. Moreover, federal education transfers to the 
states remain earmarked for specific purposes. In 1998 the government passed the 1998 Law on Fiscal Coordination, 
which gave the states a greater discretion in the use of federal education and other transfers.  
4 The enrollment rate for public schools is about 94 percent (primary), 93 percent (lower secondary) and 78 percent (upper 
secondary).   6
level, however, the private sector plays a much bigger role. It accounts for close to half of the enrollment (46 
percent). The educational system in Mexico is now so extensive that there are over 483,000 schools 
(excluding preschool) staffed by over a million teachers, of which 84.3 percent are from public schools. 
Teachers represent 2.8 percent of the full time labor force from which only 20.1 percent are private school 
teachers. 
In 1999, the public school teachers’ share
5 was 42.82 percent of the total number of government personnel. 
All teachers in public basic education are affiliated with SNTE. All teachers in upper secondary and tertiary 
education have a union of professors and administrative workers also affiliated with SNTE or are independent 
(Autonomous or State Universities).  
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
The Primary Education Assessment Survey, second round 1997 (Encuesta de Evaluación de Educación 
Primaria [EEEP], segundo levantamiento 1997) from the Ministry of Education is representative by state 
level and by stratum (urban — public and private — schools, public rural schools, indigenous schools
6 and 
community schools). Students were given standardized achievement tests at the beginning of sixth grade that 
covered the subjects studied in the 5
th grade. EEEP also collected information on schools, parents, teachers, 
supervisors, socioeconomic and academic backgrounds. Non-categorical are students' scores, age, amenities 
or facilities in the house, the number of rooms in the house, the number of teachers' updating courses, didactic 
material available to the teacher and school equipment. The survey design was stratified and multistage. In 
each stage the sample size was chosen randomly. Importantly, the final sampling unit was the school and not 
the student. The sample included 53,209 students and 3,645 schools. In matching students with their parents, 
8,450 students were lost because their parents did not respond to the questionnaire. Another 30 percent of the 
sample (number of students) was also lost when matching students with their corresponding 5
th grade 
teachers. The distribution of the scores of those students that were matched successfully suggests that there 
was not truncation in the sample. The Appendix shows the sample sizes by state and stratum and the list of 
variables employed in the analysis. 
                                                           
5 Federal, state plus autonomous school teachers. 
6 The indigenous schools refers to schools offering services to populations which mother tongue is not Spanish.   7
In order to avoid self-selection problems derived from non-response, the sample used in the subsequent 
analysis was corrected with the standard Heckman's methodology. It was assumed that the three non-
responding stages were independent. 
Stage 1: Students' characteristics self-selection problem. The probit equation for computing the Mill's ratio 
was specified as follows:  
Define yi=1 if the ith student answered the questionnaire and yi=0 otherwise. State, stratum and classroom 
size variables explain this probability. In order to identify the model, we used a set of geographical dummy 
variables at state level (trigger variable) as a measure of the differences in willingness to answer the 
questionnaire. The Probit estimation results are shown in Section 1 in the Appendix. 
Stage 2: Parents' characteristics Self-selection problem. The probit equation for computing the Mill's ratio 
was specified as follows:  
Define zi=1 if the ith student's parents answered the questionnaire and zi=0 otherwise. Geographical 
variables as state and stratum, as well as the classroom size and student's characteristics explain this 
probability. In order to identify the whole model, a set of geographical dummy variables is proposed at state 
level (trigger variable) as a measure of the differences in the willingness to answer the questionnaire. The 
probit estimation results are shown in section 1 in the annex 
Stage 3: Teachers' characteristics self-selection problem. The probit equation for computing the Mill's 
ratio was specified as follows:  
Defining xi=1 if the ith student's teacher answered the questionnaire and xi=0 otherwise. Geographical 
variables as state and stratum, as well as the classroom size, student characteristics, school characteristics, and 
director characteristics explain this probability. In order to identify the whole model, we propose a set of 
geographical dummy variables at state level (trigger variable) as a measure of the differences in the 
willingness to answer the questionnaire. The probit estimation results are shown in Section 1 of the Appendix. 
In addition, it is possible that there is a  Carrera Magisterial self-selection problem. The relationship 
observed between a student's learning and her/his teacher being in a Carrera Magisterial may occur because 
of the self-selection problem. That is, teachers who join Carrera Magisterial are likely to see themselves as 
and be highly effective teachers, so have a high probability of being rewarded. In order to avoid a possible 
self-selection problem, the standard Heckman's methodology was applied.    8
Carrera Magisterial self-selection problem. The probit equation for computing the Mill's ratio was 
specified as follows:  
Defining vj=1 if the jth teacher is in Carrera Magisterial and vj=0 otherwise. Geographical variables as 
state and stratum, as well as classroom size, teacher characteristics and school characteristics explain this 
probability. "Teacher's opinion about Carrera Magisterial program" is proposed as the trigger variable for 
measuring the differences in the application of this program, which might affect the probability of 
participation. The probit estimation results are shown in Section 1 of the Appendix. Interestingly, the age, 
region, stratum, classroom size, gender, school level, experience in 5th grade, supervision and household size 
are important in explaining the probability of enrollment in Carrera Magisterial. Being female increases this 
probability by 14% while age and experience increase it by 5% and 4.3% respectively. Selectivity bias is 
significant in urban areas but not in rural areas (see the Annex). 
In Section 4, the EEEP is used in order to measure the effect of school variables on a student’s 
performance. An exploratory analysis was performed of the school variables, which are likely to constrain, 
empower and motivate teacher's performance. For this purpose, schools were grouped into learning 
achievement quintiles. In addition, compound indexes of some of these school variables were constructed. 
Examples of school variables used were teachers’ performance, school principal's supervision, schools' 
facilities, directorial supervision at classroom level, teacher's training, career opportunities available to the 
teacher (Carrera Magisterial), experience, and school equipment, all by public/private institution and stratum. 
Section 5, which also uses the EEEP, presents the estimates of school and family effects on learning 
achievement by means of several multivariate models
7. Section 6 offers conclusions. 
 
4. THE EFFECT OF SCHOOL VARIABLES ON STUDENT PERFORMANCE: A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS. 
Mexican education literature is rich in ethnographic studies of schools in various parts of the country. In 
contrast, there are hardly any econometric studies that quantify the effects of school factors on student 
learning. There are some econometric studies (World Bank 1998; Lopez-Acevedo 1999) analyzing Programa 
para Abatir el Rezago Educativo (PARE) data, but they too are limited to a few states. This section presents a 
national/urban/rural and public/private analysis of the EEEP measuring students’ performance. The purpose 
                                                           
7 The methodology used for such a part is presented with more detail in section 5.   9
here is to test certain hypotheses regarding the determinants of student learning. These hypotheses relate to 
the effects of school quality, particularly the teachers’ quality, training, and teaching practices. Issues 
regarding teachers’ incentives, supervision, facilities, and specific students' characteristics and their parents' 
are also included in the analysis. 
Based on the EEEP from SEP, Table 1 shows the distribution of Spanish and Mathematics test scores by 
school quintiles. The best 20% schools in the nation have a score of 57.7 on average in Mathematics (out of 
100 points) and a relatively higher score in Spanish. The standard deviation is higher in this group compared 
to the rest of the learning achievement quintiles. The highest grade dispersions are concentrated at the tails of 
the distribution. 
 
Table 1.  5
th Grade Test Scores by Learning Achievement quintile 
Quintile Mathematics  Spanish 
 Mean  SD  Mean  SD 
1 40.7  2.9  46.5  2.7 
2 45.6  0.8  51.5  1.0 
3 48.4  0.7  54.5  0.7 
4 51.5  1.0  57.8  1.3 
5 57.7  4.2  65.5  5.0 
Total 48.7  6.1  54.9  6.8 
Source: Primary Education Assessment Survey, second round 1997. 
 
Table 2 shows the distribution of test scores nation-wide by stratum. Private urban schools perform 
relatively better than do other types of schools. Public urban schools rank second while indigenous schools 
are at the bottom of the distribution. Nonetheless, the grade differences between indigenous schools and 
community schools are small, particularly in Spanish scores. The highest dispersion of test scores is found in 
the learning of Spanish scores in private urban schools. 
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Table 2.  Test Scores by Stratum 
Mathematics Spanish 
Stratum Mean  SD  Mean  SD 
Community School  47.3  5.7  52.0  5.2 
Indigenous School  45.8  5.4  51.5  5.1 
Public rural school  48.2  6.0  54.0  6.2 
Public urban school  49.4  5.9  55.6  6.3 
Private urban school  53.0  6.5  62.9  8.4 
National 48.7  6.1  54.9  6.8 
Source: Primary Education Assessment Survey, second round 1997 
 
Table 3 shows classroom size, which can be taken as a measure of relative school productivity among 
stratum. Surprisingly, indigenous schools perform better in this indicator than community schools given that 
the scoring difference between them is not significant. Classroom size does not differ significantly between 
private urban schools and public urban schools although variance is greater in the latter. 
 
Table 3.  Classroom size by Stratum 
Stratum Mean    SD 
Community School  23.0  1.2 
Indigenous School  22.5  8.0 
Public rural school  21.5  7.1 
Public urban school  24.6  3.5 
Private urban school  24.3  4.5 
National 22.6  6.6 
Source: Primary Education Assessment Survey, second round 1997. 
 
Tables 4-5 below show the distribution of students by learning achievement quintiles. About 45% of 
students in private urban schools are enrolled in the top quintile of schools, compared to only 6.4 percent of 
the students from indigenous schools, which has the highest percentage of students enrolled in the bottom 
quintile of Mexican schools. These results are more pronounced in Spanish, since 61.4 percent of the students 
in private urban schools are enrolled in the best 20% schools, compared to only 4.0 percent of the students 
from indigenous schools, which also have the largest percentage of students enrolled in the lowest 20%. The 
distribution of students enrolled in public urban schools is evenly distributed across quintiles. The distribution 
of students in public rural schools is biased toward the lowest quintile.  
 
   11
 
Table 4.   5
th Grade Students Share by Mathematics Test Scores Quintiles within Stratum 
Stratum Quintile  1  Quintile 2  Quintile 3  Quintile 4  Quintile 5  Total 
Community School  26.0  23.4 20.2 18.2 12.2  100.0 
Indigenous School  33.2  26.9 20.1 13.4  6.4 100.0 
Public rural school  22.5 21.4 20.1 19.1 16.9  100.0 
Public urban school  15.7 18.5 20.6 23.9 21.3  100.0 
Private urban school  6.4  10.2 13.6 24.4 45.3  100.0 
Source: Primary Education Assessment Survey, second round 1997. 
 
Table 5.   5
th Grade Students Share by Spanish Scores Quintile within Stratum 
Stratum Quintile  1  Quintile 2  Quintile 3  Quintile 4  Quintile 5  Total 
Community School  30.7  30.5 17.7 15.2  5.9 100.0 
Indigenous School  34.8  28.8 16.7 15.7  4.0 100.0 
Public rural school  22.5 24.9 18.9 20.8 12.9  100.0 
Public urban school  15.4 20.8 17.5 25.6 20.8  100.0 
Private urban school  4.9 6.9 6.9  19.9  61.4  100.0 
Source: Primary Education Assessment Survey, second round 1997. 
 
Tables 3, 4a, and 4b in the Appendix show the distribution of the school variables across learning 
achievement quintiles. An exploratory analysis identifies different factors. Quintile 1 represents ineffective 
schools, while quintile 5 includes effective schools. For all the school strata considered, the results indicate a 
strong correlation between school effectiveness and teachers' pedagogical effort, family income and level of 
schooling. In public rural schools, parents’ expectation of a child’s scholastic achievement is positively and 
highly correlated with learning achievement. For all public schools, the quality of educational services as 
perceived by the parents has a positively strong effect on achievement. Other relevant variables in public 
schools were teaching experience, teachers' residence in the community, teachers' training, number of students 
in the classroom, enrollment in Carrera Magisterial, parents' participation in the learning process; didactic 
material available to the teacher and supervision. All other variables show a weak correlation with school 
effectiveness. 
 
5. TEACHERS’ INCENTIVES AT THE SCHOOL LEVEL IN MULTIVARIATE MODELS. 
As discussed above in the overall learning levels, the quality of basic Mexican education is low. 
According to the EEEP, 52.8 percent of 5
th grade students are below the Spanish mean of 54.9. Just over half 
are also below the Mathematics mean of 48.7. Lopez-Acevedo and Salinas (2000b) show that these average   12
achievement rates mask disparities between states and regions. What primary school characteristics contribute 
the most to student learning in a multivariate model? How do these school variables impact on learning 
achievement? This section addresses these questions, indicating the factors that increase students' success in 
primary school. 
The importance attributed to school factors is not unique, as school-level variables have a stronger effect 
on students' achievement in LDC's than in developed countries. It is clear that despite the strong contextual 
variables effect on primary level student achievement in Mexico, school variables are important. Thus, the 
identification of those school factors that lead to increase student learning is also important. Largely based on 
quantitative analysis of the EEEP, the impact of Carrera Magisterial and other important school factors on 
learning achievement are examined using multivariate models. 
The hierarchical structure of the data, with students nested within schools, requires a form of regression 
analysis that weighs the sources of learning achievement variation—students, school and teachers. To analyze 
the determinants of learning achievement, the models below were estimated. In each model, the school, 
socioeconomic and teachers´ characteristics are the same. This estimation strategy allows us to measure the 
effect of these factors on learning achievement. The first model is the variance plus school fixed model, which 
is the starting point in every multilevel analysis. 
The first model fully captures school effects through the use of a complete set of school dummies.  The 
second model uses school variables (instead of dummies) to help analyze the determinants of school factors 
on learning achievement.  Denoting child and household level variables by X, school dummies by D, and 
school variables by W, the models are: 
  Model 1 (with geographic dummies) :           yi = β’Xi  +  δ’Di  +  εi           (1) 
    Model 2 (with geographic variables) :        yi = β’Xi  +  δ’Wi  +  εi       (2) 
The two models are estimated separately for the urban and rural areas as well as nationally. 
 
 This attribute enables us to estimate the overall mean of achievement, and determine the deviations of 
student scores and school averages around that mean. The second model fully captures the students effects 
through adding student socioeconomic variables to the empty model. The third model uses school level   13
variables to help analyze the determinants of school effects on learning achievement. The fourth model drops 
the dummy variables from the third model and is estimated by ordinary least squares.  
 
ε γ γ γ α β + + + + + + = k k d d d Z X Y ... 2 2 1 1  
where, 
Y   Vector of individual student test scores, Mathematics or Spanish 
X   Matrix of student's socioeconomic background variables 
Z   Matrix of teacher's and school's variables 
 di  The dummy variables that indicate schools in the sample 
ε   Vector of residual terms [ 0 ) ( = ε E  and  0 ) (
` = εε E ]. 
 
(1)  Model 1 (fixed effects model). The model is described by the following equation, 
ij k k ij d d d Y ε γ γ γ γ + + + + + = ... 2 2 1 1 00  
where, 
ij Y  Vector of individual student test scores, Mathematics.  
00 γ   Overall mean of achievement. 
di  The dummy variables that indicate schools in the sample. 
γk  The deviations of achievement of the "k" school around the overall average. 
ε ij  The deviations of students scores around the overall average.  
 
Table 6 shows the estimates of the first model for public/private schools at national level, as well as for 
urban and rural areas. It can be seen in this table that the variation in mathematics test scores has an important 
school effect in urban/rural areas. At the national level, the total students’ scores variance is 48.35, of which 
51% of the variance component ratio is attributed to school-level effects. 
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Table 6.  The Empty Model Public and Private Schools 
Public Schools  Public and Private Schools
National Urban  Rural  National 
Total students' scores variance 48.35  56.26  46.67  48.99 
Variance within the schools  23.82  24.67  23.15  24.08 
Variance between the schools   24.54  31.59  23.52  24.90 
Variance component ratio of school effect  0.51  0.56  0.50  0.51 
Number of students 









Source: Authors' estimates using the Primary Education Assessment, second round 1997, SEP. 
 
 (2)  Model 2 with school dummies and students' characteristics: 
In order to have greater precision in the estimation of the students' effects on the learning achievement, 
several variables were introduced at the student level, including student's gender, age, pre-school education, 
repetition of 5th grade, blurred vision, teacher performance, student attitude towards learning, household size, 
household income, household utilities, number of books in house, number of rooms in house, parent schooling 
level, parent expectations of student educational achievement and parent opinion of educational services in 
the school. The variables were entered individually to test whether the coefficients remained robust. The 
model is described by the following equation: 
ij k k ij h oo ij d d d X Y ε γ γ γ β γ + + + + + + = ... 2 2 1 1  
where, 
ij Y  Vector of individual student test scores, Mathematics. 
00 γ   Overall mean of achievement. 
Bh      Vector of parameters to estimate ; 1, .., H . 
ij X   Matrix of student's socioeconomic background variables.  
dk  The dummy variables that indicate schools in the sample. 
γk  The deviations of achievement of the "k" school around the overall average conditioned on students’ 
characteristics. 
ε ij  The deviations of students scores around the overall average. 
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Table 7.  Model 2. Students' Characteristics 
National Urban    Rural 
Coeff. S.E.  Level of 
Sig.  Coeff. S.E. Level 
of Sig.  Coeff. S.E. Level of 
Sig. 
Student's gender (Male)  0.211  0.309  0.495  0.985  0.489 0.044 0.034 0.503  0.946 
Student's age  -0.358 0.150  0.017  -0.484  0.179 0.007 -0.204 0.224  0.363 
Pre-school education (Yes)  -0.069 0.279  0.805  -0.046  0.455 0.919 -0.259 0.434  0.551 
Repetition in 5th grade (Yes)  -0.652 0.323 0.044 -0.204 0.370  0.581 -0.743 0.430  0.084 
Blurred Vision (Yes)  -1.281 0.366  0.000  -1.301  0.560 0.020 -1.286 0.580  0.027 
Teacher's performance  0.244  0.070  0.000  0.382  0.084 0.000 0.227 0.107  0.034 
Student's attitude towards learning  -0.111 0.063  0.079  -0.105  0.076 0.166 -0.101 0.103  0.326 
Household income  0.152  0.054  0.005  0.135  0.053 0.012 0.115 0.089  0.194 
House services  0.023  0.017  0.188  0.023  0.022 0.296 -0.002 0.027  0.944 
Father's schooling level  0.105  0.073  0.151  0.097  0.067 0.144 0.210 0.099  0.034 
Mother's schooling level  0.121  0.065  0.062  0.127  0.065 0.052 0.081 0.111  0.466 
Parent's opinion of educational services in school 0.309  0.101  0.002  0.265  0.110 0.016 0.288 0.167  0.085 
Correction of self-selection bias at stage 2  8.441  13.094 0.519  -4.276  19.114 0.823 9.487  25.695 0.712 
Correction of self-selection bias at stage 3  -3.689 13.007 0.777 12.644  19.728 0.522  -12.356 21.904 0.573 
Constant 50.832 2.948  0.000  48.597 3.872 0.000  53.011  4.893  0.000 
Total Variance  34.958     39.105      39.228     
Variance within the schools  23.408     23.479      22.563     
Variance among the schools  11.550    15.626      16.665     
Variance component ratio of school  effect  0.330     0.400     0.425    
R squared ( explained variance)  0.277    0.305     0.159    
Students' R squared (explained variance)  0.017     0.048     0.025    
Schools' R squared (explained variance)  0.529     0.505     0.291    
Number of Students 
Number of Schools 
13,439
 1,553
   7,721 
  740 
   5,718 
   813 
  
Source: Authors' estimates using the Primary Education Assessment, second round 1997, SEP. 
 
The advantage of this model is that it provides extensive information about the sources of variation that 
constitute the R-squared. At the national level, the student socioeconomic variables explain 27.7 percent of 
the total variation. This is understandable, because almost all explanatory variables are categorical. Notice 
that this set of socioeconomic student variables explains more than 52 percent of the variation among schools 
but only explains 1.7 percent of the students’ variance. In urban areas, the explanatory power of the 
socioeconomic variables is similar to that of the national level. The introduction of  these variables has several 
effects. It reduces in absolute terms the variance among schools (from 24.54 in model 1 to 11.55 in model 2) 
because individuals are less heterogeneous. The variance component ratio of school effect from model 1 to 
model 2 dropped by 18% percent, implying that the variance component ratio of student effect increased by 
69%. Thus, schools appear to be more similar (homogenous) considering students’ characteristics, but the 
differences among schools (heterogeneity) remain relatively important. The explanatory  power of the student   16
variables is much lower for rural areas than for urban areas. These variables explain only 29.1 percent of the 
total school variance and 2.5 percent of the student variance. 
This analysis also weighed student socioeconomic profile. Males and females achieve equally in 
mathematics. Age and grade repetition have a significantly negative impact on mathematics achievement. 
These students achieve lower grades than do others. Repetition has been associated with low achievement and 
school dropout (Lopez-Acevedo, 1997). Pre-primary school level is not significant for mathematics test 
scores, possibly because parents infrequently participate in their children’s learning achievement. Additional 
work is needed to establish the links between initial education, parents’ participation and learning 
achievement. Nonetheless, the results show that the development of self-driven and studious students who 
seek information beyond  textbooks is a key factor in increased learning achievement. How to develop good 
learning habits and motivation among students should be a challenge not only to teachers but also to parents. 
Blurred vision has a large negative impact on achievement, which has been consistently strong thorough all 
estimations. Vision problems increase rapidly with age.  
Teacher's pedagogical behavior (efforts and performance in the classroom) is of great importance in 
grading learning achievement. The impact of this variable is many times larger than the impact of other school 
factors, such as didactic material available to the teacher. Students learn better when they are taught by 
teachers who teach clearly (that is, explain concepts clearly), who have a thorough knowledge of the subject 
matter and who are able to intelligently handle students’ questions and doubts. Although some individual 
teachers have introduced more interactive practices, the majority continue to use traditional, instructor-
centered approaches. No general tradition exists in Mexico for encouraging active learning, managing group 
work, developing locally relevant materials, or adapting lessons to teach problem-solving. The quality of 
teachers’ assessments of student progress appears inadequate, and teacher responses to students’ questions are 
also. 
Students in households with higher per capita income or family assets achieve higher scores. In addition, 
there is a strong positive relationship between mother’s schooling level and children learning achievement in 
urban areas and, conversely, father's schooling level and student achievement in rural areas. The quality of 
educational services, as perceived by the parents, has a considerable positive impact on learning achievement. 
   17
 
(3)  Model 3 (with student's socioeconomic index, and school and dummy variables). 
To estimate the impact of school variables on student achievement scores, conditional upon the 
socioeconomic student's profile, a socioeconomic student index was constructed by means of principal 
component analysis. In order to do this, we assumed (as suspected) that student's age, repetition in 5
th grade, 
blurred vision, student's household income, mother's schooling level, and father's schooling level were related 
to each other. Once this index is estimated, we introduce it into the regression model as an additional 
explanatory variable. Accordingly, model 3 is described by the following equation: 
ij k k j m i oo ij d d d Z I Y ε γ γ γ α β γ + + + + + + + = ... 2 2 1 1  
where, 
  ij Y   Vector of individual student test scores, Mathematics. 
00 γ     Overall mean of achievement. 
 B      Parameter to estimate 
 αm    Vector of parameters to estimate; 1, …, M. 
 Ii   Vector of student's socioeconomic index. 
Z j    Matrix of schools variables. 
 dk     The dummy variables that indicate schools in the sample. 
ε ij    The deviations of students scores around the overall average.  
 
Table 8 presents estimation of model 3 at the national level. Table 5 in the Appendix presents the 
estimations for rural and urban areas
8. As in model 2, the variables were entered individually to test whether 
the coefficients remained robust.  
 
 
                                                           
8 In order to measure the academic achievement of students, socioeconomic variables, teacher and school variables have to 
be taken into account, since students are grouped in classrooms, which are grouped in a particular school. Within a 
school, this provides different educational experiences and determines specific characteristics for students as a group, 
depending on the class they are in. At the school level, differences can be even more striking. For example, the 
environment in a private school is different from that of a state owned school. This variable grouping limits the 
usefulness of traditional statistical analysis, Ordinary Least Square analysis gives equal weight to each observation and, 
as shown in various studies in which observations are grouped in levels, the assumption gives us biased estimates.   18
 
 
Table 8. Determinants of Mathematics Achievement Scores in 5
th grade at National Level 
Public and Private Schools  Public Schools 
Coeff. Level of 
Sig.  Elasticity Coeff.  Level of 
Sig.  Elasticity
Student Socioeconomic Index  0.485 0.000    0.485 0.000   
Teacher's gender (Male)  -0.675 0.023 -0.0072  -0.916  0.015 -0.0103 
Teacher's age  0.190  0.095 0.0183  0.280  0.070 0.0270 
Attendance to updating courses (Yes) -0.931 0.074  -0.0171  0.416  0.476  0.0077 
Teacher's residence within the community  (Yes)  -0.052 0.890 -0.0004  -0.102  0.801 -0.0008 
Teacher's years of residence in the  community  0.240 0.027  0.0261  0.135 0.261  0.0148 
Teacher's schooling level  0.139 0.294  0.0103  0.219 0.183  0.0163 
Teacher's pedagogical behavior  0.053 0.034  0.0052  0.194 0.015  0.0041 
Teacher's interest in students' learning  0.288 0.023  0.0098  0.092 0.003  0.0031 
Number of updating courses  0.028 0.584  0.0030  0.021 0.709  0.0023 
Type of post. Short term (Yes)   -1.210 0.030 -0.0013  -1.177  0.014 -0.0013 
More than one post (Yes)  -0.004 0.990  0.0000  0.304  0.395  0.0014 
Teacher's income  0.135  0.225 0.0097  0.094  0.475 0.0069 
Didactic material available to the teacher 0.011  0.608  0.0033  -0.004  0.878  -0.0011 
Number of supervisor visits (as Director's  answer)  5.523 0.000  0.0754  5.484 0.000  0.0780 
Teacher's enrollment in Carrera Magisterial (Yes)        1.436  0.003  0.0187 
Carrera Magisterial level       -0.413  0.056  -0.0072 
Correction of self-selection bias at stage 2  6.886  0.222    8.146  0.154   
Correction of self-selection bias at stage 3  -9.769 0.054    -12.472  0.014   
Correction of self-selection bias in Carrera Magisterial        1.674  0.182   
Constant  45.854 0.000   44.873  0.000  
R^2     0.388      0.377
Number of Students      14847      13,767
Number of Schools      1718      1602
Source: Authors' estimates using the Primary Education Assessment, second round 1997, SEP.    n.a. Not applicable. 
 
General Results 
In general, students with teachers that have more years of experience (using age as a proxy) achieve higher 
scores in Mathematics. It is clear that teacher experience and seniority improve student achievement growth 
rates, suggesting that teacher proficiency is enhanced by practical experience and training. The marginal 
productivity of time spent in formal education of teachers on teacher effectiveness is statistically insignificant. 
But the potential of training to contribute to the improvement of teaching effectiveness appears high. The 
following findings show: the importance of teachers’ experience and practice; teacher ability to deal with 
children’s questions and doubts intelligently (implying the importance of teachers’ subject matter knowledge), 
and teacher effectiveness in monitoring students' performance or difficulties and talking to students.   19
Female teachers increase learning achievement. Interestingly, training (measured by the number of courses 
taken by the teacher) has not impacted student achievement. Moreover, each one of these courses separately 
failed to have an impact on learning achievement. Thus, investment in primary school teachers seems most 
effective when targeted towards increasing practical experience and developing content-specific knowledge.  
Teacher’s years of residence in the community increases student’s achievement, possibly because of the 
teacher’s involvement with the community. Type of post (permanent or short-term) negatively impacts 
learning achievement. A possible explanation is that in public schools, a temporary post has almost the same 
benefits as a regular or permanent post. It is extremely rare to find a case where an individual had to leave his 
job because his “short-term post” was not renewed or because it was not changed to a long-term post. For 
practical purposes, “short-term post” does not mean that the teacher has to go through a probation period. This 
system of posting and assignments generates a conflict within learning.  
Teacher’s years of schooling failed to demonstrate significant effects on student learning, which is 
expected since there is little variance in the level of schooling. A teacher's income has no significant effect on 
learning achievement, but many studies have found that teacher's salary is a poor predictor of a student's 
achievement.  
Frontline educators feel that problems relating to school infrastructure and facilities negatively affect 
teaching effectiveness and student learning achievement. Their foremost recommendation for raising school 
quality is to address this inadequacy. To what extent this recommendation will actually lead to student 
learning achievement is questionable. Some studies in other countries show that improvement in school 
infrastructure can have a significant positive impact on student learning. Mexican data do not appear to 
support this hypothesis. 
Teacher’s pedagogical efforts show a positive and significant marginal effect on learning achievement. 
Pedagogical effort and teacher answers to student questions are highly correlated with greater learning 
achievement. Other work or secondary activity does not effect a student’s test scores, possibly because only a 
small proportion of 5
th grade teachers have a secondary occupation. A large number of public school teachers, 
however, have two or more posts. As part of ANMEB, teachers have at least two posts, one at the primary 
school level and another at the lower secondary school level. Didactic materials available to the teacher and 
school facilities failed to demonstrate a significant effect on learning achievement.   20
An additional important variable to explain learning achievement in public schools was school supervision 
by the principal and supervisor. The frequency of supervisors’ school visits has a significant and positive 
correlation with student learning. It is also consistent with the PARE experience, which indicates that the 
quality of supervisors and their frequency of school visits had significant and positive effects on student test 
scores (World Bank 1998). The type of post assigned to the teacher (short and long term) has a negative 
impact on learning achievement (mathematics test scores), particularly in urban areas. Students in schools 
with a high degree of supervision on the part of the school principal achieve better scores. Thus, differences in 
school organization and management could be important for student achievement. In this study it was found 
that the availability and maintenance of school facilities have a very modest impact on learning achievement. 
Additionally, the impacts of each explanatory variable in elasticity terms were computed in order to 
compare the quantitative effects among all explanatory variables. As can be seen in Table 8, variables with 
the highest elasticity values include supervision, teacher's enrollment in Carrera Magisterial and teacher's 
interest in students' learning. 
 
Carrera Magisterial 
Carrera Magisterial was aimed at raising the quality of basic education through teachers’ career 
development, presence in schools, and working conditions. This program represents an effort on the part of 
the government to provide better support for and recognition of the valuable work of teachers.
9 
Results from the multivariate regression model show that at the national level and particularly in rural 
areas, enrollment in Carrera Magisterial positively impacts learning achievement. Notice that being in the 
Carrera Magisterial program increases a students achievement in  mathematics by 1.87 percent (3.31 percent 
in rural areas—see Table 5 in annex). However, the level in Carrera Magisterial is negatively correlated with 
learning achievement. Ultimately, the program may have good components that promote better teaching 
practices, but there is a pervasive incentive affecting teacher promotion. Results show that a large share of the 
teachers in basic education are relatively old and work in administrative tasks. 
                                                           
9 The Carrera Magisterial Program, which contains several parts, is governed by the Comisión Nacional Mixta consisting  
of officials of the SEP and SNTE.   21
The EEEP shows that 62.8 percent of the teachers in the sample are enrolled in Carrera Magisterial. In 
addition, there is no significant difference in test score distribution between students with a teacher in Carrera 
Magisterial and students without such a teacher. 
Table 9. Teachers' Share in Carrera Magisterial in 5
th grade  
Carrera Magisterial  Number of Teachers  Share 
Yes 2420  62.8 
Not 1139  29.6 
No answer  292  7.6 
Total 3851  100.0 
Source: Primary Education Assessment Survey, second round. 1997 
Non-weighted data    
 
Tables 10 and 11 present the distribution of test scores for those students in Carrera Magisterial and those 
with a teacher not enrolled in Carrera Magisterial, nationally and by stratum. Since there is no significant 
difference, one might infer that there is no selection bias with teachers in Carrera Magisterial getting the best 
students and other teachers getting worse students. 
Table 10.  Test Scores of Students with a Teacher in Carrera Magisterial 
  Number of students in the sample  Test Scores 
      Share of students with Mathematics  Spanish 
 Number Share Identified  Teachers  Mean Median SD Mean Median  SD 
In Carrera Magisterial 19029  35.8  70.9  49.0  48.6  6.1 55.1 54.4 6.3 
Not in Carrera Magisterial 7804 14.7  29.1  48.5 47.8  6.5 55.1 54.1 7.4 
Not Identified*  26376  49.6    48.6 48.1  6.0 54.8 54.1 6.8 
Total 53209  100.0  100.0     
Source: Primary Education Assessment Survey, second round 1997. 
* "Not Identified" refers to those teachers who could not be matched to their respective students. 
 
Table 11. Test Scores by Teacher's Carrera Magisterial Status by stratum 
    Teacher is enrolled in Teacher is not enrolled  Teacher 
Stratum   Carrera Magisterial  In Carrera Magisterial not  identified 
Community School  Mean      47.3 
 Median      47.2 
 SD      5.7 
Indigenous School  Mean  45.6  45.7  46.0 
 Median  45.5  45.5  46.3 
 SD  5.4  5.6  5.3 
Public rural school  Mean  48.4  47.9  48.1 
 Median  47.8  47.8  47.8 
 SD  6.2  6.2  5.8 
Public urban school  Mean  49.7  49.9  49.0 
 Median  49.2  49.2  49.2 
 SD  5.9  6.9  5.6 
Source: Primary Education Assessment Survey, second round 1997. 
* "Teacher not identified" refers to those teachers who could not be matched to their respective students.   22
 
Students in rural schools with a teacher in Carrera Magisterial achieve slightly better scores than their 
peers (Table 11). In public urban schools, there is no significant difference as there is in the case of 
indigenous schools. Few teachers in private urban schools report being enrolled in Carrera Magisterial. This 
could be a result of a sampling error, or because a teacher works at both public and private schools. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This study is the first to link family background, teacher profile, and schools characteristics to student 
achievement. In the analysis of comparing high effective schools versus low effective schools, the main 
findings were: Private urban schools have a relatively better performance than do other types of schools.  
Public urban schools rank second, while indigenous schools are at the bottom of the distribution. Student 
enrollment in public urban schools is evenly distributed across quintiles. The distribution of students in public 
rural schools is biased towards the lowest 20 percent of schools. For all school strata, the results indicate a 
strong correlation between school effectiveness and teachers' pedagogical effort, family income and level of 
schooling. Other relevant variables in public schools were teaching experience; teachers' residence in the 
community; teachers' training as measured by content of the course taken; the number of students in the 
classroom; enrollment in Carrera Magisterial; parents' participation in the learning process; didactic material 
available to the teacher and supervision. All other variables show a weak correlation with school 
effectiveness. 
Multilevel analysis showed that variation in mathematics test scores has a significant effect for all 
geographical levels. Additionally, national level student socioeconomic variables explain 27.7 percent of the 
total variation. Whereas this set of variables explains more than 52 percent of the variation among schools, it 
explains only 1.7 percent of the student-level variation. For urban areas, the power of explanation of these 
variables is similar to the power for national level areas. On the other hand, the predictive power of these 
variables is much lower for rural areas. The school level variation in the outcome scores reflects the 
socioeconomic student variables to an important extent. However, some of the remaining within-school 
variation might be explained by other explanatory variables. Another remarkable result is that although the   23
inclusion of student variables significantly reduces the variance component ratio of schooling, this ratio 
remains relatively important. 
As expected, family background factors are important in student achievement. The quality of educational 
services, as perceived by the parents, has a considerably positive impact on learning achievement. Another 
important result is that blurred vision has a large negative impact on achievement, which is consistently strong 
throughout all estimations. 
In the third model, type of post (permanent or short-term) has a negative impact on learning achievement. 
Teacher’s years of schooling and income failed to demonstrate significant effects on student learning. 
Teacher's pedagogical efforts show a positive and significant marginal effect on learning achievement. 
Pedagogical effort and teacher answers to student questions are highly correlated with greater learning 
achievement. Didactic materials available to the teachers and school facilities failed to demonstrate a 
significant effect on learning achievement. Another striking result is that the teacher’s enrollment in Carrera 
Magisterial has a positive relationship with learning achievement; however, the higher the level reached by 
the teacher in this program, the lower the student's learning achievement becomes, particularly in rural areas. 





•  The family background factors are not merely important in explaining student enrollment, but are also 
important in determining the student's achievement. The importance of these demand factors brings 
out the relevance of targeted social programs such as PROGRESA, which not only may have an 
impact on enrollment but may also influence students' achievement through affecting the family 
socioeconomic level. 
•  Blurred vision has a very significant negative impact on students' achievement. Accordingly, it will be 
very important to expand the eyeglasses program throughout basic educational system and to 
make this program permanent.   24
•  Training, as measured by the number of courses taken by the teacher, does not significantly impact 
student achievement. Moreover, each one of these courses separately failed to have an impact on learning 
achievement. Thus, investment in primary school teachers seems most effective when it is targeted 
to increasing practical experience and developing content-specific knowledge. 
•  The type of post (permanent or short-term) has a negative impact on learning achievement. A possible 
explanation is that in public schools a temporary post (short-term) has almost the same benefits as a 
regular or permanent post. For practical purposes, “short-term post” does not mean that the teacher has to 
go through a probation period. Thus, it creates a pervasive relationship in the system of posts and 
assignments that have a conflict with learning. Therefore, a review of the rules for defining this kind 
of post needs to be done in order to provide the right signals to the short-term teachers. 
•  Teacher’s enrollment in Carrera Magisterial has a positive relation with learning achievement; however, 
the level in Carrera Magisterial is negatively correlated with the student's learning achievement. The 
bottom line is that the program might have some good aspects that possibly promote better teaching 
practices but there is a pervasive incentive as to how the teacher is promoted. Additionally, the results 
show that a large share of the teachers in basic education are relatively old and working in administrative 
tasks. Accordingly, Carrera Magisterial’s criteria for assignment to a level must be revised in order 
to avoid perverse incentives. Another important issue in this regard is to eliminate the Carrera 
Magisterial option, namely Tercera Vertiente (Pedagogical Technician, Técnico pedagogico), which 
is likely to increase such perverse incentives. 
•  Students in schools with a high degree of supervision on the part of the school principal achieve better 
scores.  Indicators of organizational and management differences among schools need to be 
implemented in order to evaluate how those schools' organization (with a high degree of 
supervision) affects students achievement. 
 
Future research 
•  Pre-primary school level is not significant for mathematics test scores. However, additional work is 
needed to establish the linkage between initial education, parent participation and learning achievement. 
Nonetheless, results show that the development of self-driven and studious students, who seek   25
information beyond their textbooks, is a key factor in increased learning achievement. How to develop 
good learning habits and motivation among students should be a challenge not only to teachers but also to 
parents. 
•  CM's assessment should not be made only on the basis of whether it helps to provide better pay for good 
teachers and retain them, but also on whether it pushes bad teachers to improve.  Testing this assessment 
will require a panel data of teachers. 
•  Linking teachers' pay to the rate of growth (not the level) in their students' grades in standardized tests  
would require a panel of students. Lopez-Acevedo (1997) shows that teachers’ salary is weakly correlated 
to changes in learning achievement. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
The National Agreement for the Modernization of Basic Education 
 
The decentralization process intended to create a state agency that would receive all the federal resources. 
In previous efforts to decentralize the educational system, the Federal Government through SEP established 
state delegations that were in charge of some administrative functions. These units were in charge of the 
reception of the federal educational system. Gradually, the delegations gained new responsibilities and 
administrative power that facilitated the negotiation of the ANMEB with the States and the SNTE. These 
delegations created a new political setting where state union leaders and teachers started to gain power and, as 
a result of political negotiations, allowed entry of many new parties. This participation and internal struggles 
in the SNTE weakened the rigid structure that opposed the previous decentralization programs. Each state had 
a different situation before and after the agreement, as we can see in the next table: 
 
BEFORE THE NATIONAL AGREEMENT AFTER THE NATIONAL AGREEMENT
AGUASCALIENTES AGUASCALIENTES
CAMPECHE CAMPECHE
GUERRERO GUERRERO CREATION OF A 
HIDALGO HIDALGO DECENTRALIZED
MORELOS INEXISTENT STATE MORELOS STATE ORGANISM
OAXACA SYSTEM OR HIGHLY OAXACA (Institute)
QUERETARO UNDERDEVELOPED QUERETARO
QUINTANA ROO QUINTANA ROO
TAMAULIPAS TAMAULIPAS
BAJA CALIFORNIA SUR BAJA CALIFORNIA SUR STATE MINISTRY





CHIHUAHUA COEXISTENCE OF  CHIHUAHUA
DURANGO ORGANISMS WITH DURANGO COEXISTENCE OF THE
GUANAJUATO THE DOMINANCE OF THE GUANAJUATO MINISTRY AND THE
NAYARIT FEDERAL SYSTEM NAYARIT DECENTRALIZED ORGANISM
PUEBLA PUEBLA (With dominance of the





BAJA CALIFORNIA BAJA CALIFORNIA COXISTENCE OF THE 
JALISCO COEXISTENCE WITH JALISCO MINISTRY AND A
MEXICO AN EQUALIZED STATUS MEXICO DECENTRALIZED ORGANISM
NUEVO LEON NUEVO LEON (With dominance of the




This table shows that the states have responded in different ways to the decentralization process, making it 
easier or harder, depending on their abilites to absorb their new functions and responsibilities. The   27
coexistence of different agencies makes the process harder because sometimes teachers belong to different 
sections of the SNTE, and each struggles to control the teaching posts in the new state educational agencies. 
Another problem was the equalization of social benefits, because there are differences among the states and 
federal levels that made it almost impossible for the government to cover such differences. The delegation and 
reception of responsibilities were as follows: 
Responsibilities of the Federal Government after the ANMEB 
•  Operative:   Provide educational services in the Federal District. 
•  Normative:  Elaborate the legal framework that rules the basic educational system. 
•  Administrative: Transfer of the basic educational system to the states and setting up the agreements. 
•  Financial: provide compensatory expenditures (the latter through federal agencies like CONAFE) to the 
most underdeveloped regions to eliminate inequities between states and regions. 
•  Evaluative: Establish the evaluation procedures for the national educational system. 
•  Formulative: Plans for the educational system, authorization and periodic revision of the free textbooks. 
•  Financial: Allocate fiscal resources among the states through federal transfers. 
•  Precautionary: Supervise the proper use of the resources allocated to the states in cooperation with state 
agencies. 
 
Responsibilities of the State Governments after the ANMEB 
•  Operative: Directly provide the educational service. 
•  Normative:  Guarantee labor rights and social benefits to the transferred workers. To issue state 
educational laws. 
•  Administrative: Create public organisms for receiving the transferred system and integrate both systems 
into a single agency. Establish agreements. 
•  Financial: Allocate increasing resources in real terms to basic education. 
•  Evaluative:  Design a state evaluation system. 
•  Formulative: Propose regional contents for the programs in basic education. 
 
Responsibilities for Municipalities after ANMEB   28
•  Operative: Promote and provide educational services within territories. 
•  Administrative: Establish agreements to coordinate or unify educational services. 
•  Financial: Provide resources for the school maintenance and equipment. 
 
TAX COLLECTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS 
 
In order to maintain the new responsibilities of states in the administration of the educational system, it 
was necessary to complement the ANMEB with the transfer of resources that could make those objectives 
feasible. Despite its strategic importance, the transfer of resources has not always been clear and has had 
different impacts on each state. 
Certain states complain because of they contribute more to the federal government than they receive from 
it.  Furthermore, the levels of government also include municipalities, which have different attributes and 
obligations, making it difficult to establish rights on the use and collection of taxes.  
 
In Mexico, the tax collection scheme follows these rules:  
The federal government is  solely responsible for the collection of the following taxes: 
ISR (Tax on rents); Tax on assets; IVA (Tax on consumption); IEPS (Special taxes on production and 
services), and taxes on exports and imports.  
The States are responsible for the collection of: 
Taxes on the use of vehicles; Taxes on patrimonial transference (inheritances); Taxes on notaries and judicial 
business; Taxes on Transactions not subject to IVA; Taxes on public shows; and, Taxes on payrolls. 
Municipalities are responsible for the collection of: 
Prevail (a property tax) and Taxes on public services (garbage collection, sewage, water, etc.). 
 
The Law of Fiscal Coordination, in which the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP) establishes 
the attributions of each Ministry of the Federal Government, rules the collection of these taxes. This law also 
determines the allocation criteria for the Federal Taxes, establishing that 20% of the Participatory Fund 
(created by the collection of federal taxes) goes to the States under the name of Federal Participation to States. 
This participation is the main source of income for the States from which they fund their own expenditure   29
including expenditures on education. Thus, State Expenditures on Education are financed by the resources 
that each State receives from the federal taxes in form of Federal Participation and by the funds different from 




The decentralization process needed for both levels of government (state and federal) be responsible for 
the educational financing. This meant that states had to increase the use of their own resources because their 
expenditure was much smaller than the Federal expenditures. The proportions that the two levels of 
government had to contribute for financing education, however, were undefined. This leads in different 
degrees of effort by the state government to increase state expenditures on education. Another problem is that 
states do not have a clear and consistent classification of the funds they use on education. There is also 
insufficient information about state spending on each level. Although some states have increased their 
expenditures on education, most expenditures goes to the payroll, and there are still many states that have not 
increased their own participation, depending on a higher degree of the federal transfers and participation. As 
much as this effort grows, states would be able to spend more money on specific programs in order to increase 
the quality and coverage of education, depending to a lesser extent on the Federal Government. 
 
Federal Expenditure 
The organization and administration of federal expenditures on education has changed recently, as a result 
of the 1998 reforms in the Law of Fiscal Coordination. In this reform, the ramo 33 was created to complement 
the new official policy for a new federalism. Starting from the assumption that the State Government is more 
efficient in the provision of some services (including educational services and the significance of improving 
the provision of these services), the SHCP organized a new scheme on how to finance these sectors.  
Before reform, the Federal Government channeled the resources for education to the states through ramo 
25 (Contributions to Basic Education) and ramo 26 (Previsions for Salaries). The ramo 11 is the channel to 
transfer funds for the maintenance of SEP and has not been changed.  With the creation of ramo 33 in 1998, 
federal expenditure on education became part of a package of resources intended for education, health   30
services and infrastructure. 
 
Reform and Allocation Criteria 
The 1998 reform established new funds under ramo 33 that worked as institutional transfer channels. 
These funds are: 
Basic Education Contributions Fund; Health Service Fund; Social Infrastructure Fund; Fund for the 
Strengthening of the Municipalities; and Multiple Contributions Fund. 
The Basic Education Contribution Fund (ramo 33) now includes ramo 25 and ramo 26.  Since the 
resources are labeled, they cannot be used for any other purposes than education. This is one of the main 
features of the reform: it gives the states more power for the supervision of the use of resources. According to 
the Project of Expenditures Budget of SHCP, at present, the states’ legislatures have the responsibility of 
supervising the pertinence, efficiency and transparency of the use of Education resources. The Basic 
Education Contributions Fund, (FAEB) is negotiated annually by each state with SEP. 
 
The basis for these negotiations consists in two criteria: 
•  Irreducible Expenditure: This part is based on the number of students, teachers and schools that each state 
has at the beginning of an academic year. According to this number, SEP establishes a certain amount that can 
maintain the functions of the whole state educational system including some resources for general services, 
materials and personal services.  
•  New necessities: Near the end of the academic year, each state negotiates more funding with SEP in order 
to cover the new necessities created by an increased demand for educational services or by the increased offer 
of teachers for the following academic year. Here, states can ask for more resources if they want to implement 
a specific program. Only states that satisfy SEP criteria for the creation of new locations will receive the 
necessary increment of resources. These criteria are established in the Booklet of Detailed Programming 
(Manual de Programacion Detallada) for the pre-school, primary and lower secondary levels. 
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After receiving each state’s proposal, the SEP analyzes the increment viability in federal transfers for 
education, then sends its Expenditure Budget Proposal to the SHCP, which is the last opportunity for 
government denial or approval. 
There are some resources that might be used for education but are not part of ramo 33. These resources are 
classified under different items and most are still administered by the federal government:  
1.  The Fund for the Administrator Committee of the Federal Program of Schools Construction (CAPFCE). 
2.  The National Council for the Educational Promotion (CONAFE). 
3.  Compensatory Resources under programs as PARE, PRODEI, etc. 
4.  Resources from other agencies as SEDESOL and DIF. 
 
In the case of the CAPFCE, a new process of decentralization has been taking place since 1998. The 
committee has been transferring funds to states and municipalities so that they can be responsible for the 
construction, rehabilitation and maintenance of schools in pre-school and lower secondary. The responsibility 
for primary schools is already the competence of the state governments, and the idea is to gradually transfer it 
to all levels of education. 
The decentralization process is distantly incomplete, since there are states with two organisms taking care 
of the educational system with duplicity of functions. This situation implicates a fiscal cost that is beyond the 
scope of this study, but which future research should analyze. To facilitate the administration and provision of 
the services as well as the collection of educational statistics and the integration of policies, it is desirable to 
have a single agency that directs the educational system. A unique agency in each state could make the 
educational supervision an easier task as long as the attributions of this organism are well defined. The 
efficiency of this organism largely depends on adequate use of resources.  The latest reforms in the allocation 
of funds tend to prevent their misallocation, which themselves are not sufficient. 
Another dimension in which the performance of the states is crucial for the well functioning of the 
transmission is the ability to raise funds from other sources (private investment or savings) generated from the 
correct administration of funds. If states depend largely on resources transferred by the federal government, it 
would be harder for them to allocate increasing resources to areas or programs different from the payroll. 
States have to avoid this situation to be able to fund specific projects to improve the quality of educational   32
services, developed by them, according to their own necessities. To this extent, the states would become really 
autonomous—otherwise decentralization would be merely administrative. 
The Booklet of Detailed Programming describes some general guidelines based on two characteristics—
increase of coverage and consolidation of service.  
The first of these categories, the coverage increase, ultimately depends on the increase of demand for 
education in the localities in which further funding is required. Each state, city or locality that claims the need 
for more educational resources must justify requests for money. Under the first of these categories, the 
requirements that localities have to fulfill in the pre-school level are the following: 
•  There should exist an educational service at the primary level but not at the pre-school level. 
•  There should be enough demand for establishing a pre-school. 
•  There should be a need for an increase in the teaching of Spanish to indigenous people. 
 
The second category, consolidation of service, refers to the analysis of the workplace when the student-
teacher ratio justifies the increase or reallocation of teachers and principals. When localities present the 
following justifications, then they are eligible to receive more resources: 
•  Workplaces where teachers are not servicing the number of students established in the parameters. 
•  Schools where teaching, administrative and directive staff does not correspond with the staff authorized 
by the “Direccion General de Personal.” 
 
At the primary level, the eligible localities for receiving more funding according to the first category are: 
•  Regions without the primary educational services or with suspended services. 
•  Regions that have experienced demographic growth, which would justify the change from a community 
service to a formal primary service. 
•  Indigenous villages that need the service according to established parameters. 
 
According to the second category, consolidation of service at the primary level makes eligible those work 
centers with one, two or three teachers, incomplete organization, and demand increases. The schools that fall 
in this category are those with:   33
•  One, two or three teachers where academic burden requires an additional teacher. 
•  Incomplete organization and where the academic burden, through the application of established 
parameters, makes allowances for a large number of grades. 
•  Complete organization with a larger number of groups, and teachers in a previous grade that justify the 
need of one more teacher. 
 
The same two categories exist at the lower secondary level.  Increase of coverage is related to demand 
analysis. Localities allowing greater attention to potential students for this specific level are the most likely to 
receive the additional funds. These localities should have: 
•  Primary educational service and the necessary number of students for the installation of a lower 
secondary school. 
•  Potential growth of working groups that justify the expansion of first grade groups. 
•  Saturation of the Morning Schedule that justifies the creation of an Evening Service. 
•  Population growth that requires the creation of new educational center. 
 
Eligibility in the category of service locality consolidation accords with the following criteria: 
•  Localities where a natural promotion from first to second and from second to third grades justifies 
increase of working groups and support staff. 
•  Localities where teachers and administrative staff do not correspond to the staff authorized by the 
General Direction of Human Resources and Labor Relationships, SEP.  
 
Each level has its own parameters regarding the distribution of students and teachers. The parameters are 
presented in the next table:  
 
PARAMETERS FOR PRE-SCHOOL LEVEL 
•  One community instructor should attend localities with less than 20 students. 
•  From 20 to 119 students the ratio students/teacher should be 20 to 29 students per teacher. 
•  From 120 to 244 students, the ratio should be 30 to 34 students per teacher.   34
•  In localities with more than 245 students, the ratio should be 35 to 45 students per teacher. 
•  In indigenous localities with 15 to 99 students, the ratio should be 15 to 19 students per promoter 
(equivalent of a teacher for those communities). 
•  In indigenous localities with 100 to 174 students, the ratio should be 20 to 24 students per promoter. 
•  In indigenous localities with more than 175 students, the ratio should be 25 students per promoter.  
 
PARAMETERS FOR PRIMARY LEVEL 
•  From 30 to 50 students: One teacher. 
•  From 50 to 80 students: Two teachers. 
•  From 80 to 135 students: Three teachers. 
•  From 135 to 180 students: Four teachers. 
•  From 180 to 225 students: Five teachers. 
 
PARAMETERS FOR LOWER SECONDARY LEVEL 
•  Tele lower-secondary: Morning Service, 30 to 45 students per group. 
•  General lower secondary: Morning Service, 30 to 50 students per group. 
•  General lower secondary: Evening Service, 30 to 45 students per group. 
•  Lower secondary for Workers: Night Service, 29 to 42 students per group. 
•  Industrial Technical lower secondary: Morning Service, 30 to 50 students per group. 
•  Industrial Technical lower secondary: Evening Service, 30 to 45 students per group. 
•  Agricultural Technical lower secondary: Morning Service, 29 to 47 students per group. 
•  Agricultural Technical lower secondary: Evening Service, 29 to 47 students per group. 
•  Fishing Technical lower secondary: Morning Service, 29 to 47 students per group. 
•  Technical lower secondary: Evening Service, 29 to 45 students per group. 
•  Forest Technical lower secondary: Morning Service, 29 to 46 students per group. 
•  Forest Technical lower secondary: Evening Service, 30 to 57 students per group.   35
APPENDIX II 
 
1. THE DATA 
 
The Primary Education Assessment Survey, second round 1997 (Evaluación de Educación Primaria, segundo 
levantamiento 1997), from The Ministry of Education (SEP) is representative of state level and by stratum (urban {public 
and private} schools; public rural schools; indigenous schools and community schools). Tables 1 and 2 show the sample 
size by state and stratum. 
 
Table 1. Number of Students by State and Stratum, Second Round 1997. 













AGUASCALIENTES  4    452 746 120  1,322 
BAJA CALIFORNIA    74  432  842  84  1,432 
BAJA CALIFORNIA SUR 4    386  792  78  1,260 
CAMPECHE  9  166 487 707  89 1,458 
CHIAPAS  49  125 379 391  92 1,036 
CHIHUAHUA  12  37  379 907 100  1,435 
COAHUILA  14    718 2,155 732 3,619 
COLIMA      444 653 124  1,221 
DISTRITO  FEDERAL      3,756  676  4,432 
DURANGO  31  197 489 485  88 1,290 
EDO. MEXICO  16  99  433  878  62  1,488 
GUANAJUATO 20    483  613  51  1,167 
GUERRERO  59  105 643 447  76 1,330 
HIDALGO  44  143 488 489  91 1,255 
JALISCO  42  289 388 797 108  1,624 
MICHOACAN  69  399 384 558  95 1,505 
MORELOS 15  48  420  927  64  1,474 
NAYARIT 6  14  441  679  81  1,221 
NUEVO  LEON  6    411 939 104  1,460 
OAXACA  34  448 709 516  64 1,771 
PUEBLA  20  401 432 473  96 1,422 
QUERETARO  18  52  504 500 138  1,212 
QUINTANA ROO  5  45  385  809  85  1,329 
SAN LUIS POTOSI  35  444  464  497  90  1,530 
SINALOA  20  16  415 643 103  1,197 
SONORA  2  412 345 773 477  2,009 
TABASCO  20  409 544 484  71 1,528 
TAMAULIPAS 12    394  787  73  1,266 
TLAXCALA 6    533  604  79  1,222 
VERACRUZ  45  800  1,867  2,083 66 4,861 
YUCATAN  10  400 409 830  74 1,723 
ZACATECAS 11    484  517  98  1,110 
Total 638  5123  15742  27277  4429  53,209 
Source: Primary Education Assessment Survey, second round SEP, 1997   
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Table 2. Number of Schools by State and Stratum, Second Round, 1997. 













AGUASCALIENTES 2    25 29 7 63 
BAJA  CALIFORNIA    4 24  38 5 71 
BAJA CALIFORNIA SUR 2    46  32  5  85 
CAMPECHE  4  24 50 29  4 111 
CHIAPAS  21 14 31 18  4  88 
CHIHUAHUA  6  3  60 37  5 111 
COAHUILA  6    82 89 32  209 
COLIMA     32  28  5  65 
DISTRITO  FEDERAL      157  36  193 
DURANGO  18 42 59 21  3 143 
EDO.  MEXICO  6  4 31  37 6 84 
GUANAJUATO  11  28  26  3  68 
GUERRERO  23 8 41  27 4  103 
HIDALGO  17 15 41 20  5  98 
JALISCO  16 34 48 35  8 141 
MICHOACAN  35 27 36 23  4 125 
MORELOS  4  2 24  39 5 74 
NAYARIT  3  3 37  27 4 74 
NUEVO  LEON  3    57 41  5 106 
OAXACA  16 37 50 22  4 129 
PUEBLA  8  33 30 19  6  96 
QUERETARO  7  7 31  20 5 70 
QUINTANA  ROO  2  9 28  35 4 78 
SAN  LUIS  POTOSI  21 51 45 21  5 143 
SINALOA  14 2 42  26 4 88 
SONORA  2  73 38 34 23  170 
TABASCO  8  37 39 20  3 107 
TAMAULIPAS 8    38  32  4  82 
TLAXCALA 3    26  25  3  57 
VERACRUZ  20 81  201  113 4 419 
YUCATAN  5  44 30 36  4 119 
ZACATECAS 6    44  21  4  75 
Total  297  554 1,394  1,177 223 3,645 
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Stage 1: Student's characteristics Self-selection problem. The Probit estimation results are as follows, 
Probit estimates                                  Number of obs   =      52571 
                                                  Wald chi2(5)    =    3650.62 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood =  -12216.36                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2888 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
                          |             
   prob1                  |      Coef.      z     P>|z|   
--------------------------+------------------------------ 
State (Trigger variables) |  All relevant dummies were significant 
Stratum 2                 |  -.8827347  -26.466   0.000   
Stratum 3                 |  -.3403305  -13.440   0.000   
Stratum 5                 |  -.1263167   -3.169   0.002   
C.R. size                 |   .0400382   22.891   0.000   
Constant                  |   2.700305   47.287   0.000   
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Stage 2: Parents' characteristics Self-selection problem. The probit estimation results are as follows, 
Probit estimates                                  Number of obs   =      43615 
                                                  Wald chi2(11)   =    1618.34 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -19051.299                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0497 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
                          |               Robust 
   prob2                  |      Coef.       z     P>|z|  
--------------------------+------------------------------ 
State (Trigger variables) |  All relevant dummies were significant 
Stratum 1                 |   .6878342     7.451   0.000  
Stratum 3                 |   .7453377   .10.984   0.000  
Stratum 4                 |   .3772254   .14.357   0.000  
Stratum 5                 |   .0963005   . 2.649   0.008  
C.R. Size                 |    .007563   . 3.838   0.000  
Stud. Gender              |   .0237731   . 1.106   0.269  
Stud. Age                 |   -.030966    -2.394   0.017  
HH size                   |  -.0224988   .-2.729   0.006  
Stud. Preprim             |   .0617427   . 2.027   0.043  
Stud. Likes Sch.          |  -.0105957   .-1.113   0.266  
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Stage 3: Teacher's characteristics Self-selection problem. The probit estimation results are as follows, 
Probit estimates                                  Number of obs   =      38642 
                                                  Wald chi2(25)   =    1589.93 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -23498.156                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0533 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
         |                
   prob3 |                      Coef.      z     P>|z|   
---------+----------------------------------------------- 
State (Trigger variables)|  All relevant dummies were significant 
Stratum 2                |   .3109471     5.975   0.000  
Stratum 3                |   .0773937     2.897   0.004  
Stratum 5                |  -.1863633    -5.340   0.000  
Classroom size           |   .0150317     7.735   0.000  
Student Gender           |  -.0266508    -1.305   0.192  
Student Age              |  -.0347406    -2.943   0.003  
HH size                  |  -.0152332    -2.072   0.038  
Student's Preprimary Educ|   .0148598     0.511   0.610  
Student's Likes school   |  -.0130222    -1.441   0.150  
School's Area            |   .0148403     2.536   0.011  
Schools' Director Educat.|  -.0093204    -1.449   0.147  
School's Material 2      |  -.0923364    -1.979   0.048  
School's Material 3      |   .1020397     4.215   0.000  




Carrera Magisterial Self Selection Problem 
 
Carrera Magisterial self-selection problem. The probit equation results are as follows, 
 
Probit estimates                                  Number of obs   =      22040 
                                                  Wald chi2(37)   =    2669.65 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -11540.659                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1724 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                      Robust 
  carmag                      Coef.   Std. Err.       z     P>|z|         dF/dX 
-----------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
State                  |   All relevant dummies were significant  
Stratum 2              |  -.7613951   .0597008    -12.754   0.000      .3706374 
Stratum 3              |  -.1237808   .0312558     -3.960   0.000      .3876072 
Classroom size         |   .0130532    .002017      6.472   0.000      .0017506 
Teacher gender (Male=1)|   -.446673   .0293384    -15.225   0.000      -.1419307 
Teacher age            |     .19615    .011233     17.462   0.000      .0479354 
Teacher's Schooling    |   .1297847   .0122191     10.621   0.000      .0313395 
Codependents           |   .1178115   .0105022     11.218   0.000      .0291940 
Experience in 5
th grade|   .1043082   .0086326     12.083   0.000       .0431934 
Supervisor's visits    |   .1187639   .0119659      9.925   0.000       .0087112 
Teacher's opinion C.M. |   .1361276   .0190356      7.151   0.000       .0485315 
(The Trigger Variable) | 
Constant               |  -1.328442   .1141722    -11.635   0.000       
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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2. VARIABLES’ DEFINITIONS 
NAME  DEFINITION IN THE 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION   SCALE 
Mathematics achievement  Score obtained in the math 




The exam scores are re-scaled 
using the Rash model 
 
0-100 
Spanish achievement  Score obtained in the Spanish 
exam, which covers 5
th grade 
topics. 
The exam has six parts, reading 
comprehension, use of graphics, 
writing, language interpretation, 
literature and writing expression. 
The grade is given by the 
percentages of correct answers. 
 
0-100 
Student's Gender (Male)  Male student   Dummy   
 










Pre-school education (Yes)  Whether the student attended 
preschool 
 
Dummy    
Blurred Vision (Yes)  Does the student see what is 
on the blackboard? 
 
Dummy  
Teacher’s performance, (as 
perceived by the student) 
Quantitative indicator of the 
teacher's performance in 5
th 
grade from the student's point 
of view. This index was 
constructed through principal 
component analysis. 
Continuous. This index includes 
variables such as Teacher's 
assistance; student's 
comprehension of what the teacher 
explains; Teacher's behavior when 
students ask questions; and, Does 
the teacher provide all answers to 
the student doubts? 
 
0-100 
Student’s attitude towards 
learning 
Quantitative Indicator of the 
student's attitude towards 
learning in 5
th grade. This 
index was constructed 
through principal component 
analysis. 
 
Continuous. This index includes 
variables such as time spent on 
homework, frequency of research 
tasks and homework, and, the use 
of additional books for 
assignments.  
0-100 
Household Size  Number of family members 
 
Categorical 1-5 





House utilities  Services in house.  Categorical. Categories were 
constructed using availability 
indicators of water, drainage, 
electricity, telephone, and 
combinations of these. 
 
 
Father's schooling level  Student’s father schooling  Categorical  0-6   40
level 
 




Household head economic 
sector 
Student’s household head 
economic sector 
A set of dummies variables. 
Economic sectors are defined as 
Professional Services, Agriculture, 
Manufacturing, Commerce, 




Parents involvement in the 
student's homework 




Parents meet with the 
teacher (Yes) 
Meeting with the teacher to 




Parents meet with the 
Director (Yes) 
Meeting with the Director to 




Number of books in house 
 
Number of books in house  Categorical 1-6 
Amenities or facilities in 
house  
House amenities or facilities, 
which include radio, washing 
machine, refrigerator, gas 
stove, and television. It is 
assumed that the impact of 
each one is the same 
. 
Continuous 0-5 
Number of rooms in house 
 
Number of rooms in house  Continuous  1-5 
Parent's expectations of the 
student's educational level 
achievement 
 
Index of parent's expectations 
of the student's educational 
level achievement. 
 
Categorical. This index includes 3 
values: low, medium and high 
expectations. 
1-3 
Parent's opinion of 
educational services in 
school 
Index of Parent's opinion of 
educational services in school 
 
Categorical. This index includes 3 




Family's standard of living  Family's standard of living 
index. 
 
Categorical. This index includes 3 
values: low, medium, adequate 





Teacher’s age  Categorical  1-8 
Teacher's gender (male) 
 
Teachers gender  Dummy   
Teacher's residence within 
the community (yes) 
Place of Residence (within or 
outside the community) 
 
Dummy  
Teacher's years of 
residence in the 
community 
Year of residence in the 
community 
 
Categorical 1-6   41
Teacher's schooling level  Teacher’s schooling  Categorical. This variable includes 
5 values: Lower Secondary, 
Preparatory level of teachers 
training, 3 years (Normal Básica 3 
años), Preparatory level of teachers 
training, 4 years (Normal Básica 4 
años), Tertiary level of teachers 




Attendance to updating 
courses (Yes) 
 
Attendance to updating 
courses 
Dummy  
Number of updating 
courses 
Number of updating courses 
taken by the teacher 
 
Continuous 0-5 
Teacher's experience as 
primary teacher 
 
Teacher’s experience as 
primary teacher 
Categorical 1-5 
Type of post. Short term 
(Yes) 
 
Type of post  Dummy   
More than one post (Yes) 
 
More than one post  Dummy   
Teacher's income 
 




Another activity  Dummy   
Classroom size 
 





Didactic material available 
to the teacher 
 
Didactic material includes 
Maps; Biology Tools; 
Blackboard Geometry Tools; 
Spanish Dictionary; 
Reference Books and several 
reading material; etc. It is 
assumed that each didactic 
material has the same impact 




index (as perceived by the 
own teacher) 
Quantitative indicator of 
teacher's performance in 5
th 
grade from the teacher's point 
of view. This index was 
constructed through principal 
component analysis. 
Continuous. This index includes 
variables such as Teacher's 
pedagogical behavior; Teacher's 
interest in students' learning, 
Teacher's adaptability given the 
learning results, Teacher fosters 
students to self-learning, number 
of meetings with parents of low 
achievement children, Teacher's 





If the student gives the wrong 
answer, What is the teacher's 
pedagogical behavior?  
Categorical 0-3   42
 
Teacher's interest in 
students' learning 
How frequent does the 
teacher have talks with 
her/his students about 




Number of supervisor's 
visits (as answered by the 
teacher) 
  
Number of supervisor's visits  Categorical  1-4 
Number of supervisor's 
visits (as answered by the 
Director) 
 
Number of supervisor's visits  Categorical  0-5 
      
Teacher's enrollment in 
Carrera Magisterial (Yes) 




Teacher's years of 
enrollment in Carrera 
Magisterial 
 
Years in Carrera Magisterial Categorical  1-5 
Carrera Magisterial Level  Level in which the teacher is 








Director's Age  Categorical  1-8 
Director's experience  Director's experience  Categorical 
 
 
School equipment  The schools have Maps, 
Computers, Scientific 
Models, Television, 
Videocassette Recorder, and 
Digital Projector. It is 
assumed that every teaching 
tool has the same impact on 
learning process. 
Continuous 1-7 
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3. HIGH EFFECTIVE AND LOW EFFECTIVE SCHOOLS. QUINTILE ANALYSIS 
 
Table 3. Teacher and School Characteristics by Quintile    
Variable  Quintile 1 Quintile 2  Quintile 3 Quintile 4  Quintile 5 
Teacher’s performance, (as perceived by the student) *  0.68  0.70  0.70  0.72  0.73 
Student’s attitude towards learning *  0.52  0.52  0.50  0.50  0.49 
Teacher's performance index (as perceived by the own 
teacher) *  0.81 0.81 0.79 0.80  0.79 
Parent's expectations of the student's educational level 
achievement ***  0.28 0.33 0.37 0.42  0.48 
Parent's opinion of educational services in school ***  0.47  0.44  0.45  0.47  0.53 
Teacher's gender (male) ** 0.70  0.59  0.56  0.51  0.35 
Teacher's Age ***  4.18 4.52 4.76 4.78  5.04 
Teacher's residence within the community (yes) *  0.32  0.28  0.44  0.42  0.49 
Teacher's years of residence in the community ***  5.08  5.15  5.40  5.42  5.45 
Teacher's schooling level ***  3.32  3.68 3.56 3.57  3.70 
Attendance to updating courses (Yes) **  0.46  0.53  0.44  0.47  0.50 
Number of updating courses *** 2.73  2.84  2.40  2.93  3.13 
Teacher's experience as primary teacher ***  4.36  4.57  4.88  4.77  4.84 
Type of post. Short term (Yes) *  0.12  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.03 
Teacher's pedagogical behavior ***  0.92  0.93  1.09  1.11  1.03 
Teacher's interest in students' learning ***  1.71  1.65  1.65  1.64  1.66 
More than one post (Yes) **  0.10  0.15  0.29  0.24  0.23 
Secondary Occupation (Yes) **  0.12  0.22  0.10  0.12  0.14 
Classroom size  20.17  22.94  22.55  23.13  23.34 
Teacher's income ***  3.07 3.50 3.48 3.47  3.71 
Didactic material available to the teacher   5.84  8.45  6.69  7.81  9.74 
Number of supervisor's visits (as teacher's answer) ***  1.52 1.51 1.43 1.29  1.23 
Teacher's enrollment in Carrera Magisterial (Yes) **  0.24  0.31  0.32  0.35  0.35 
Carrera Magisterial Level **  0.34  0.41  0.41  0.47  0.47 
Mean(dr28) ***  1.09  1.54  2.00  2.38  2.39 
Number of supervisor's visits (as Director's answer) *** 1.68  1.61  1.25  0.83  1.12 
Number of meetings with parents from children with 
low achievement level ***  0.73 0.69 0.65 0.66  0.69 
Parent's involvement *** 1.60  1.75  1.79  2.00  2.12 
Director's income***  3.48  3.75  4.05  4.32  4.37 
Director's Age ***  5.21  5.56  5.95  6.21  6.12 
Director's experience ***   3.81  3.66  4.11  4.20  4.02 
School equipment ***  1.54  1.68  1.97  2.27  2.80 
Source: Primary Education Assessment Survey, second round 1997, Sep.      
Note: * Index from 0 to 1; ** Share; and, *** Categorical variable.       
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Table 4a.  Teacher and School characteristics by Quintile and Stratum 
Stratum  Quintile 1  Quintile 2  Quintile 3  Quintile 4  Quintile 5 
Teacher’s performance, (as perceived by the student) * 
Community  Schools  0.72 0.69 0.70 0.64 0.70 
Indigenous Schools  0.67 0.68 0.67 0.70 0.64 
Public rural school  0.68 0.69 0.70 0.72 0.71 
Public  urban  school  0.71 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.75 
Private urban school  0.71 0.69 0.64 0.74 0.73 
Parent's expectations of the student's educational level achievement *** 
Community  Schools  0.23 0.17 0.23 0.34 0.20 
Indigenous Schools  0.29 0.32 0.26 0.33 0.22 
Public rural school  0.27 0.32 0.33 0.35 0.34 
Public  urban  school  0.36 0.38 0.43 0.46 0.53 
Private urban school  0.40 0.55 0.47 0.57 0.65 
Parent's opinion of educational services in school *** 
Community  Schools  0.43 0.49 0.28 0.37 0.41 
Indigenous Schools  0.52 0.50 0.47 0.44 0.46 
Public rural school  0.45 0.43 0.46 0.49 0.49 
Public  urban  school  0.47 0.45 0.44 0.45 0.52 
Private urban school  0.62 0.50 0.57 0.61 0.61 
Number of updating courses *** 
Community  Schools  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Indigenous Schools  2.99 3.42 2.24 2.61 0.93 
Public rural school  2.81 2.97 2.43 3.17 2.89 
Public  urban  school  2.80 2.31 2.57 2.88 3.62 
Private urban school  0.19 4.63 0.64 2.55 3.03 
Type of post. Short term (Yes) ** 
Community Schools  n.d.  n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 
Indigenous Schools  0.17 0.00 0.05 0.36 0.11 
Public rural school  0.12 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.00 
Public  urban  school  0.02 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.04 
Private urban school  0.00 0.20 0.01 0.00 0.04 
Secondary Occupation (Yes) ** 
Community Schools  n.d.  n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 
Indigenous Schools  0.12 0.52 0.04 0.06 0.17 
Public rural school  0.12 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.20 
Public  urban  school  0.18 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Private urban school  0.45 1.00 0.03 0.26 0.13 
Classroom size *** 
Community Schools  n.d.  n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 
Indigenous Schools  4.07 5.65 4.58 4.51 2.39 
Public rural school  4.10 4.46 4.49 4.52 4.74 
Public  urban  school  5.12 5.09 5.12 5.37 5.45 
Private urban school  1.91 1.80 5.36 4.96 5.07 
Source: Primary Education Assessment Survey, second round 1997, Sep.   
Note: * Index from 0 to 1; ** Share; and, *** Categorical variable.    
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Table 4b.  Teacher and School characteristics by Quintile and Stratum 
Stratum  Quintile 1  Quintile 2  Quintile 3  Quintile 4  Quintile 5 
Teacher's income *** 
Community Schools  n.d.  n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 
Indigenous Schools  2.62 3.50 2.13 2.22 2.93 
Public rural school  3.19 3.52 3.37 3.24 3.85 
Public  urban  school  3.64 3.46 3.78 3.77 3.92 
Private urban school  1.91 2.60 2.08 2.31 3.12 
Didactic material available to the teacher *** 
Community Schools  n.d.  n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 
Indigenous Schools  5.24  11.15  5.68 5.90 1.51 
Public rural school  6.31 8.31 6.35 7.44 8.84 
Public  urban  school  7.63 7.46 7.45 8.24  10.89 
Private urban school  0.72 8.68 5.82 8.00  10.32 
Teacher's enrollment in Carrera Magisterial (Yes) ** 
Community Schools  n.d.  n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 
Indigenous Schools  0.19 0.06 0.22 0.09 0.05 
Public rural school  0.27 0.40 0.31 0.33 0.44 
Public  urban  school  0.34 0.31 0.37 0.40 0.48 
Private urban school  n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Number of meetings with parents from children with low achievement level *** 
Community  Schools  0.76 0.74 0.86 0.87 0.70 
Indigenous Schools  0.75 0.71 0.67 0.74 0.70 
Public rural school  0.73 0.73 0.65 0.66 0.72 
Public  urban  school  0.65 0.59 0.63 0.65 0.70 
Private urban school  0.07 0.79 0.72 0.71 0.63 
Director's Income *** 
Indigenous Schools  2.96 2.33 3.22 3.40 2.69 
Public rural school  3.62 4.02 4.02 4.39 4.46 
Public  urban  school  4.17 4.20 4.26 4.41 4.34 
Private urban school  3.84 3.94 2.22 3.47 4.40 
School Equipment *** 
Community Schools  n.d.  n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 
Indigenous Schools  1.44 1.33 1.36 1.55 1.08 
Public rural school  1.61 1.66 1.77 1.80 1.96 
Public  urban  school  2.20 2.08 2.27 2.49 2.83 
Private urban school  2.30 3.28 2.90 3.72 4.22 
Source: Primary Education Assessment Survey, second round 1997, Sep.   
Note: * Index from 0 to 1; ** Share; and, *** Categorical variable.   
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Table 5.  Determinants of Mathematics Achievement Scores in 5
th grade in Urban and Rural 
Areas 
Urban Areas  Rural Areas 
Coeff.  Level of 
Sig.  Elasticity Coeff.  Level of 
Sig.  Elasticity
Index 0.497  0.000    0.472  0.000 
Teacher's gender (Male)  -0.375 0.310 -0.003  0.754  0.568 0.0100
Teacher's age  0.350  0.055  0.036 -0.818  0.148 -0.0759
Attendance to updating courses (Yes) 0.522  0.401  0.009  -0.933  0.520  -0.0177
Teacher's residence within the community (Yes)  -0.714  0.065  -0.008  1.740  0.129  0.0099
Teacher's years of residence in the community (Yes)  0.019  0.876 0.002  0.573  0.084 0.0622
Teacher's schooling level  0.256 0.117 0.019  -0.483  0.246  -0.0365
Teacher's pedagogical behavior 0.238  0.001  0.005  0.018  0.048  0.0004
Teacher's interest in students' learning 0.451  0.035  0.015  0.509  0.032  0.0173
Number of updating courses  0.020 0.698 0.002  0.086  0.043 0.0093
Type of post. Short term (Yes)   -1.218  0.141  -0.001  5.766  0.040  0.0072
More than one post (Yes)  -0.046  0.895  0.000  4.153  0.026  0.0130
Teacher's income  0.059  0.655 0.004  -0.332  0.277  -0.0235
Didactic material available to the teacher 0.013  0.575  0.004  -0.224  0.003  -0.0626
Number of supervisor visits (as Director's answer)  5.237  0.000  0.045  dropped   
Teacher's enrollment in Carrera Magisterial (Yes)  0.032  0.947 0.000  2.797  0.005 0.0331
Carrera Magisterial level  -0.302 0.186 -0.006  -0.450  0.400  -0.0068
Correction of self-selection bias at stage 2  19.149  0.001    -1.931  0.849 
Correction of self-selection bias at stage 3  -20.915  0.000    -7.794  0.306 
Correction of self-selection bias in Carrera Magisterial  -0.420  0.764    -1.295  0.600 
Constant 48.219  0.000    56.266  0.000 
Source: Authors' estimates based on The Primary Education Assessment Survey, second round, SEP 1997. 
Note: Figures in bold are significant at 5%. 
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